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Abstract 
We provide first-time evidence of the post-investment performance and survivorship profile of angel-
backed companies. Using a unique database of 111 angel-backed companies that received angel 
investments between 2008 and 2012 and at least 3 years of post investment financial data, we show that 
both the performance and the probability of survival of investee companies, are positively affected by the 
presence of: 1) angel syndicates and 2) by the hands-on involvement of business angels. Differently, the 
lack of angel experience and the structure of equity provision negatively affect the development of new 
ventures. Our results provide insights on the contribution of angel investors to the development of new 
ventures. 
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1. Introduction 
Market data at both the US and European level (US ACA, 2016; EVCA, 2016; EBAN, 2016; 
Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016; OECD, 2016) provide evidence of the growing and significant relevance 
of BAs as a main provider of capital to startup companies. BAs have filled the so-called “funding 
gap” existing between demand and supply of early stage equity capital thus promoting 
entrepreneurship and economic growth (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 2012; Capizzi, 2015). 
Despite their economic impact, to date little is known on the performance of investments backed 
by business angels. This lack of knowledge is comparable to the status of Venture Capital 
research prior to the seminal Sahlman (1990) study.  
One major factor affecting the quality of the research is the availability of data given the relatively 
high opaqueness of the market and the generally narrow representativeness of survey based 
samples (Harrison and Mason, 2008; Capizzi, 2015; Lerner et al., 2016). Additionally, 
performance studies are further limited by the severe lack of data on private companies in most 
countries. As a result, contributions investigating the performance of angel-backed companies 
primarily rely on anecdotal or case-based evidence (Hellman, 2013; Kerr et al., 2014; Mason et al. 
2016). 
In this paper we fill this gap by looking at a unique database containing qualitative and 
quantitative information on over 810 deals made by 330 unique business angels on 619 unique 
companies from 2008 to 2014 in Italy. Italian regulation requires mandatory disclosure of annual 
financial statements also for private companies. Building on this feature we extract a sample of 
111 angel-backed companies invested between 2008 and 2012 for which we collect survivorship 
and financial performance information up to 3 years after the investment.  
Our main unit of analysis is the relative impact of specific BAs’ traits, investment style and 
background so to identify the “angel investment formula” that ultimately maximizes the value 
creation potential of the target venture. This allows us to focus on BA-backed companies only 
without requiring the identification of a matching sample of non-angel backed start-ups. 
A critical methodological issue is the selection of an accurate set of metrics to measure 
performance. The extant literature looking at the impact of venture capitalists on the 
performance of portfolio companies generally adopts as measures of performance one or more of 
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the followings: turnover, employees, market share, capital assets (Brav and Gompers, 1997; 
Davila et al., 2003; Puri and Zarutsky, 2012). However, angel-backed companies are generally 
pre-revenue and their financial accounts are often limitedly informative, up to the point that 
companies can shut down without having generated any sale or having capitalized significant 
assets. In this respect the literature on angel-backed companies has tried to identify alternative 
metrics. Kerr et al. (2014) developed three different sets of measures: first, they build two binary 
indicators for survival and success (survival after 4 years from the funding event; successful exit 
through IPO or acquisition); second, they employ three outcome variables for growth 
(employment, patents, website traffic); finally, they treat as a performance measure the 
capability of an angel-backed company to raise subsequent venture financing. Levratto et al. 
(2017) analyze the impact of BAs on firm growth, as measured by the rate of growth in sales, 
employment and tangible capital assets. 
In this paper, we first perform a benchmark analysis using traditional measures – namely firm 
size and turnover – then we contribute to the literature by developing an original proxy 
(“PERFORMANCE-INDEX”) for the performance and the probability of subsequent survival of 
investee companies differentiating companies according to their generation pattern of both 
revenues and profits. The basic idea behind our measurement procedure is that it takes time for a 
startup receiving an equity injection that dramatically changes its pre-investment size to (i) 
deploy the operating investments outlined in the fundraising process, (ii) adjust the business 
model and company operations, (iii) start experiencing cash inflows, earnings and increase in the 
equity capital base. As a consequence a common growth path following an equity capital injection 
implies some years of zero or low revenues, negative profits and equity capital erosion, followed 
by an increase in turnover depending on the beginning of the operations, which could lead to an 
increase in earnings, cash flows and dividends. This pattern may also imply transitory periods of 
limited, null or negative net asset value before reverting positive growth and a sustainable 
business model.  
Following this argument, our PERFORMANCE-INDEX is designed as an ordinal variable which can 
assume five different values associated with five different company outcomes, capturing 
differences across the sample on the quality of the funded ventures, based on different 
combinations of revenues, asset value and income. 
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Since we observe each venture in a time span from t=0, which is the year when the BA’s 
investment occurred, to t=3, each firm can change its status one or more times during the 
observation period, the PERFORMANCE-INDEX is structured as a panel variable that allows to 
dynamically capture changes in the quality profile of angel-backed companies. Interestingly 
serves also as a proxy of their probability of survival, because it is reasonable to assume that 
successful ventures should experience a higher probability of survival over time than those 
obtaining lower scores. Conversely, we would expect those ventures showing negative scores to 
be future candidates to failure in the subsequent time period. 
Our panel data analyses show that the performance and the probability of survivorship of 
investee companies are positively affected by the presence of angel syndicates and by the hands-
on involvement of business angels, while they are negatively affected by the monitoring effort, 
especially for lower experienced angels. Furthermore, the angel-specific practice of fragmenting 
the provision of equity investment has a negative impact on the probability of default and the 
financial performance. 
Given that the development of new ventures might be endogenously determined by some angel 
characteristics, we perform a set if instrumental variable regressions to control for this possible 
problem. Our results are unchanged and support our main conclusions.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the second section will present the 
hypotheses development; the third paragraph we outline the empirical methodology and present 
the present the results of the econometric analysis; in the fourth section we present the 
conclusive remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
One major trend observed over time in the market for informal venture capital is the emergence 
of co-investments made by groups of angels, which have lead to a transformation of the 
investment practices formerly adopted by the “solo” angel investors (Paul and Whittam, 2010; 
Gregson et al., 2013; Mason, Botelho and Harrison, 2016; Bonini et al., 2016). Co-investments 
could be made through different degrees of angel syndicates, ranging from structured BANs to 
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semi-informal BAGs or to informal so-called “club deals” made up on a spot basis just to 
undertake a single investment opportunity (Lahti and Keinonen, 2016). 
By co-investing in a given deal, BAs can enjoy the opportunity to better diversify their investment 
portfolio as well as to share the information and know-how of other more experienced angels. 
While in a previous contribution Bonini et al. (2016) found evidence of a positive relationship 
between capital invested by BAs and co-investments, in this paper we focus on the effect co-
investing generates on angel-backed companies. In fact, a company being funded by a syndicate 
of angels can leverage on a wider set of monetary and non monetary contributions than that 
potentially available from a solo angel, thus increasing its growth potential as well as it future 
probability of survival. Higher number of angels simultaneously investing means the possibility 
to immediately start the business with higher size scale, market potential and with an increased 
probability to get access to subsequent rounds of financing over time. A further monetary 
contribution for the angel-backed company comes considering that investors can share the 
burden of the normally high costs of due diligence, contracting and monitoring required to 
minimize the adverse selection and moral hazard issues as well as the high agency costs implicit 
in so informationally opaque an equity investment. Also the non monetary returns are higher, in 
that the funded venture can enjoy multiple sources of coaching and mentoring as well as benefit 
from each BA’s industrial knowledge, previous entrepreneurial and management experience, 
relationship networks. It is to be highlighted that our arguments are consistent with a resource-
based approach applied to entrepreneurial finance (Wright et al. 1998; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; 
Wiltbank, 2005; Bonnet and Wirtz, 2012), whose major implication is the relevant similarities of 
BAs’ cognitive processes and entrepreneurs’ ones. Furthermore, according to Penrose (1959) the 
kind of contribution and growth opportunity a firm can achieve by a given investor is also related 
to the specific personal experience and learning process of the latter, who is path dependent and, 
therefore different from investor to investor 
This means the presence of co-investors implies an higher quality selection process and a more 
effective – also because of the possibility to leverage on wider experience and knowledge – post 
investment involvement, leading to our first research hypothesis 
H1: The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected by the presence of co-
investors. 
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As highlighted by many authors, BAN membership offers a wide range of opportunities, first of all 
the possibility to benefit from higher quality deal flow. Other contributions come from the 
information and knowledge sharing effects taking place inside the community, thanks to the 
activity of the BAN managers (so-called “gatekeepers”), who also organize periodic training 
meetings as well as pitching events aimed at stimulating the interaction between angel investors 
an entrepreneurs looking for funding (Ibrahim, 2008; Paul and Whittam, 2010; Brush et al., 2012; 
Mason, Botelho and Harrison, 2016). In particular, the possibility for unexperienced angels to get 
access to the human capital (made up of experience, education, external standing) of experienced 
angels inside the BAN is a valuable opportunity that could subsequently increase their capability 
to contribute to the value creation process of the investee companies (Shane, 2000). Also the 
quality of the post involvement contribution given to the angel-backed venture is enhanced by 
BAN membership, which gives the possibility to fine tune and optimize BAS’ decision making 
styles according to their specific investment behavior, ultimately increasing the probability of the 
company to raise additional growth capital (Wiltbank et al., 2009; Bonnet, Wirtz, Haon, 2013). 
Thus, we think it’s possible to apply to business angel networks, not only highlighting the 
contribution given by venture capitalists to startup firms (Lerner, 1994; De Clercq et al. 2006; 
Hsu, 1996) but most of all basing upon the evidence that a  
As such, consistent with major findings coming from the extant literature dealing with social 
capital literature (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1992), we argue that investors’ strong social 
generate significant valuable investment opportunities by granting them access to superior 
information about startups and the environmental conditions they face (Burt, 2005; Alexy et al. 
2012). 
We accordingly formulate our second research hypothesis 
H2: The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected by membership of BAs in 
a given BAN. 
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One fundamental disciplining as well as monitoring mechanism in venture capital is “stage 
financing”, an investment practice consisting in fractioning the capital infusion in multiple 
subsequent rounds of financing – also called follow-on investments. In this respect, venture 
capitalist exploit the option to differ over time their equity contributions, conditional on the 
venture reaching some target milestones, typically related to financial profitability (size or 
revenue goals) or technological or scientific achievements (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995; 
Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Tian, 2011). However, such mechanism 
generally implies relatively long time periods between two financing rounds and each round is 
typically provided to the investee as a single capital contribution.  
Differentiating from the formal venture capital industry practices, the investment process of 
business angels is often not completed all at once in a single investment round, but is fractioned 
in two or more cash outs and deferred within a time period of up to 12 months. Such an 
investment practice depends on several possible explanations, one of them being a matter of 
liquidity of financial wealth: it could take some time for the BA to deploy the committed share of 
his personal wealth at the signing of the deal (t=0), thus financial constraining the operations 
and investments of the angel-backed companies. Second, it could be a soft and informal risk 
management mechanism undertaken by less experienced angels aimed at generating further 
information about the entrepreneur and the venture prior to increase their involvement in the 
firm. A third possible explanation could deal with the degree of involvement of the BA in the 
funded venture: BAs desiring to play an active role in the firm would develop a kind of empathy 
toward the entrepreneurial project, ultimately giving them the incentives to increase their 
investment in the company beyond what they could do had not the possibility implement a 
deferred equity infusion pattern. 
This leads to the following research hypothesis 
H3: The performance of angel-backed companies is negatively affected by a temporally deferred 
equity infusion pattern: multiple follow-on investments decrease the performance of the 
investee companies. 
 
One major contribution of business angels lies in the non-monetary contribution provided to the 
funded venture through an active involvement in company operations (Harrison and Mason, 
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1992; Mason, 2006; Landstrom and Mason, 2016). BAs can add value through several different 
channels ranging from mentoring the entrepreneur and company manager, to providing 
networking in the financial and industrial community, to originating business opportunities, fine 
tuning the governance mechanisms or optimizing the accounting and control systems (Politis, 
2008). If these contributions can meaningfully add valu, an opposite - hands-off - approach, 
typical of pure financial investors should be associated with lower performance especially for 
BAs that neither co-invest with other active BAs nor joining a BAN (Bonini et al. 2016). 
We accordingly formulate our fourth research hypothesis: 
H4: The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected by BAs’ active 
involvement. 
 
One major issue dealing with an equity investment in small, risky, informationally opaque 
unlisted companies is the possibility to set up appropriate monitoring mechanisms in order to 
reduce the incentive to opportunistic behavior by the entrepreneur and/or the management 
team of the funded venture. 
The finance literature extensively investigated the effectiveness of a wide number of contingent 
contracts and financing mechanisms implemented by venture capital organizations to decrease 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (Sahlman, 1990; Triantis, 2001; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Chemmanur et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2009; 
Cumming and Johan, 2013). 
In the case of angel investing, however, many contributions highlighted the low frequency of such 
“hard monitoring” based mostly on financial contracting, due to the negative impact on the 
relationship between the investee company and business angels, which has rather to be 
grounded on reciprocal trust. Therefore, the major substitutes for contractual monitoring are 
“soft” monitoring mechanisms like geographical proximity, BAs’ knowledge of the industry and 
the business model, experience coming from previous investments and existing interactions with 
entrepreneurs (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wilbank and Boecker, 2007; Ibrahim, 2008; Wong et al., 
2009; Goldfarb et al., 2012; Bonini and Capizzi, 2017). Such approach however may lead to 
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underestimating the development of the venture risk and a late intervention on a sidetracking 
business. We therefore hypothesize the following last research hypothesis: 
H5: The performance of angel-backed companies is negatively affected by BAs’ soft monitoring. 
 
3. Sample data and variables 
Our data are obtained from sequential surveys administered by the Italian Business Angels 
Network Association (IBAN) to its associates and other unaffiliated BAs. IBAN is the national 
trade association for angels and angel groups/networks. A full description of the survey 
procedure and of summary statistics is reported in the Appendix. 
In order to investigate how the BA investment-decisions affects firm performance and survival, 
following prior contributions (Kerr et al., 2014; Alemany and Villanueva, 2015), require available 
data for each firm for a at least four years. In particular we observe each venture in a time span 
from t=0, which is the year when the BA’s investment occurred, to t=3 . We therefore select 
deals in the 2008-2012 surveys to ensure the availability of financial statements 3 years after the 
investment for all sample firms.  
From a starting sample of 695 deals, we had to exclude a significant number of observations 
because the name of the target company was not or incorrectly specified preventing an 
unequivocal identification. This reduces the sample to 302 start-ups. We then performed a hand-
made search on two external data sources, Orbis and Lexis/Nexis, in order to collect data from 
financial statements and any relevant information on acquisitions and initial public offerings 
involving the selected ventures. This procedure returns complete data for 111 firms. Table 1 
reports details of the filtering process.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The sample coverage is fairly uniform across years with the exception of 2008 that exhibits a 
significantly lower number of deals. This figure likely due to two different factors: first, 2008 is 
the inception year for IBAN surveys. Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the procedure had been 
refined in the following years. Second, because of the eruption of the financial crisis, the second 
half of 2008 has experienced a record low number of new firms creation. We address this 
possible concern by introducing year fixed-effects in all regressions that should absorb a 
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significant portion of such heterogeneity. Additionally, we also run a robustness check on three 
sub-samples obtained by restricting the year of the BA’s investment. Results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  
In Table 2, Panel A, we show the industry distribution of the final sample data.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Looking at the industry distribution of investments, deals are spread out across several 
industries, with a not surprising dominance of “traditional” sectors, such as ICT, electronics and 
biotech, which collectively attract approximately half of the aggregate investments. Interestingly, 
13% of the amount invested is directed at cleantech-related ventures, consistent with a rising 
global trend of this activity taking place all over the world. 
We report summary statistics on revenues, earnings and net asset value in Panel B and  for the 
time span from t=0 to t=3 in Panel C. Considering the revenues, we can observe that many 
ventures have already started to sell their products or services at t=0, while 9 per cent of firms 
show zero revenues.  It is interesting that 16 per cent of firms show zero revenues two years 
after the BA investment and 5 per cent of them are still inactive three years later, confirming that 
BAs are patient investors, available to wait for years before the business starts it operations and 
begins generating revenues as well as cash flows. Looking at the net asset value, we observe that 
the average assets of approximately 250,000 euro and maximum 1 m/euro fit in the profile of 
newly funded companies. However, it is worth noting that several firms show a negative net asset 
value already in the BA’s investment year and that their incidence grows in the subsequent years, 
consistent with the peculiar revenues and cash flow generating patters of companies in the early 
stages of their life cycles which makes them the peculiar asset class for BAs and venture 
capitalists (Gompers, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Harrison and Mason, 2002, Landstrom 
and Mason, 2016). Not surprisingly, more than half of the participated firms show negative net 
income in the year when the deal was made. Nevertheless, the incidence of ventures with 
negative earnings remains high also in the subsequent years, representing roughly half of the 
sample in t=3. 
We measure the performance of angel-backed companies by deriving a synthetic index 
(PERFORMANCE-INDEX) which assumes five different ordinal scores:  
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- 2 when revenues, net asset value and net income are positive; 
- 1 when revenues and net asset value are positive but net income is negative; 
- 0 when revenues are positive but net asset value and net income are negative; 
- -1 when revenues are zero and net income is negative but net asset value is positive;  
- -2 when revenues are zero and net income and net asset value are negative. 
Since the collection and analysis of firms’ annual reports allows us to observe the changes in 
value of the accounting items over time, each firm can change its status one or more times during 
the observation period. Thus, our PERFORMANCE-INDEX is a panel variable. 
Table 3 describes in detail the distribution of frequency of ordinal value in the observation period 
from t=0 to t=3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
In table 4 we present descriptive statistics of the set of the explanatory and control variables. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
We test the first research hypothesis through the variable Co-investors, which should be 
positively related with our performance index. This variable assumes values from a minimum of 
zero to a maximum of 15 investors. Considering the median and the mean values, however, we 
observe that the majority of angel-backed companies have less than five associated investors.  
In our second research hypothesis we test the impact of BAN affiliation on performance with the 
dummy BAN-membership. In presence of co-investors, the variable assumes the value one if at 
least one BA participating in the deal shows a BAN affiliation. 
Our third research hypothesis deals with the kind of monetary injection chosen by BAs which 
could be realized either with a single investment round at t=0 or according to a deferred 
temporal pattern through follow-on investments, though in a short time frame (usually less than 
one year). In order to generate a measure of this anomalous and original investment practice, we 
build the dummy variable Equity_infusion_pattern, which assumes the value of one for those 
ventures that have received two separate capital injections by the same BA. Table 8 present 
descriptive statistics for the sample conditional on the value assumed by the 
Equity_infusion_pattern variable. The statistics do not support the possible argument related to 
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BAs wealth and experience, while the high share of BAs playing an active role in the business 
project could constitute first descriptive evidence supporting the BA’s empathic behavior 
argument toward the entrepreneur. It is also interesting to observe that all the ventures receiving 
two separate capital injections already produce positive revenues at t=0 and have positive net 
asset value but negative net income.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  
With the dummy Active involvement, we control for the presence of an active role of BAs in 
providing valuable non-monetary contributions (i.e. industrial, financial, strategic, relational 
competences) to the funded venture. Our fourth research hypothesis will be confirmed whether 
we find evidence that such an active role has a positive influence on firm performance and 
consequently on its probability of survival over time. 
To test our final research hypothesis, we built an ordinal variable (Soft-Monitoring) assuming 
value from 1 to 5 depending on the frequency of the visits a BA makes to its portfolio companies 
(Bonini et al., 2016), where 1 means very limited involvement (no or few company visits) and 5 
means high involvement (a constant presence in the firm). We want to investigate whether an 
increase in the monitoring effort is a sufficient and effective value contributing tool available to 
BAs or, rather, a behavior negatively affecting the performance of the angel-backed company 
because of its impact on the trust and the quality of the relationship with the entrepreneurial 
team, especially in a context lacking of the more formal hard monitoring mechanism, contractual-
based, typically implemented in venture capital deals. 
Following the extant literature we add to our tests a vector of controls capturing BAs’ 
characteristics. A first series of controls are angel-specifics and take into account age, experience 
– as measured by the number of past deals – and the share of the equity stake assumed by the 
BAs (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Shane, 2000; Paul et al. 2007; Sudek, 
2008; Macht, 2011; Collewaert and Manigart, 2016). We expect more profitable ventures to be 
positively affected by older and more experienced BAs. Furthermore, the higher the control in the 
funded venture (either considering the share of the solo angel or considering the cumulative 
equity stake of the angel syndicate joining a given deal), the higher the commitment to make 
more and more effective the monetary and non-monetary contributions BAs give, thus increasing 
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both performance and probability of survival of the angel-backed company. A second series of 
control are firm-specifics and deal with the company size –  as measured by its monetary equity 
base – its age and stage in the life cycle - measured by the positive value of revenues before the 
investment (t=0) – and its location (domestic or abroad based). Consistent with extant 
literature, we expect that the performance of angel backed companies is positively affected by 
their size, age and pre-investment revenue capacity (Wiltbank et al., 2006; Alemany and 
Villanueva, 2015; Levratto, 2017) and negatively affected by their location (Sudek, 2008). Finally, 
we complete the model by considering time and industry fixed effects for their expected impact 
on angel-backed companies’ performance (Harrison and Mason, 2002; Wiltbank and Boekor, 
2007; Werth and Boeert, 2013; Kerr et al., 2014; DeGennaro and Dwyer, 2014; Capizzi, 2015; 
Alemany and Villanueva, 2015; Levratto et al., 2017).  
 
4. Methodology and results 
4.1. The determinants of the performance of angel-backed companies 
We begin our econometric analysis by performing a set of ordinal logistics (Ologit) regressions 
analysis on 111 firms observed over four-year time period, where t=0 is the year of the BA’s 
investment. The dependent variable is the five-stage ordinal variable PERFORMANCE-INDEX. We 
address potential heteroskedasticity concerns in two ways: firstly, we perform a logarithmic 
transformation of the explanatory angel-specific control variables Share_BA and Equity and of the 
square root of the explanatory Firm-specific control variable Firm-Age; second, we compute 
Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
The base model in Equation (1) tests the main research hypotheses related to the influence of co-
investing (Co-investors), of a BAN affiliation (BAN_Membership) and of a temporally deferred 
equity injection (Equity_infusion_pattern). Since the probability of performing well is reasonably 
higher for those firms that are already active in t=0, and therefore not in the earliest stages of 
their life cycle, we also add a control for the presence of positive revenues in the year when the 
angel investment has been made (Pre-Investment Revenues). Finally, we add time and industry 
controls. 
Performance-Index = f(Co-investors, BAN_Membership, Equity_infusion_pattern, Pre-
Investment Revenues, Industry, Year)    (1) 
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Equation (2) adds to the previous model the proxies Active Involvement, Soft-Monitoring and 
Age-Firm.  
Performance-Index = f(Co-investors, BAN_Membership, Equity_infusion_pattern, Active 
Involvement, Soft-Monitoring, Age-Firm, Pre-Investment Revenues, 
Industry, Year)       (2) 
Equation (3) applies the full set of explanatory variables presented in Table 7. 
Performance-Index = f(Co-investors, BAN_Membership, Equity_infusion_pattern, Active 
Involvement, Soft-Monitoring, Age-BA, Experience-BA, Share_BA, 
Age-Firm, Equity, Foreign, Pre-Investment Revenues, Industry, Year) 
     (3) 
Model results, presented in Table 6 (column (1)-(3)), show that a higher number of co-investors 
positively affects the performance of angel-backed companies, thus confirming our first research 
hypothesis. By getting access to equity capital raised by a syndicate of BAs, a company can also 
leverage on a wide set of non-monetary contributions, leading to an increase in its performance 
and probability of survival.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
The independent variable is statistically significant in each model specification. Differently from 
our expectation, the affiliation to a BAN does not seem to affect the probability of success of angel 
backed firms. However, this could be due to the intrinsic features of our survey-based dataset, 
which doesn’t allow for the possibility to take into account the intrinsic qualitative differences in 
the many kind of BANs, BAGs and angel associations potentially existing.  
One direction for future research, hence, could be the analysis of the differences in the quality of 
the services and contributions different kind of BANs offer to their members (Kerr et al., 2014; 
Landstrom and Mason, 2016). 
The dummy Equity_infusion_pattern is significant in all model specifications and appears with a 
negative sign. Thus, in order to increase performance and to guarantee higher probability of 
survival over time to the angel-backed venture, equity capital should be injected in a single 
investment round, rather than through multiple follow-on investment in a short time period. 
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Investing in t=0 the 100% of the committed capital could be a proof of a high quality 
entrepreneur-investor relationship, where trust, information disclosure and mutual recognition 
of each other’s contribution – monetary and non-monetary – play a major role, ultimately 
affecting firm’s future performance.  
This result might be affected by endogeneity in that investors may choose to provide capital in a 
fragmented fashion only to firms that have an inherently higher degree of risk. We tackle this 
issue Table A2 in Appendix, shows the results of an endogeneity control performed on the 
dummy Equity_infusion_pattern. The instrument is the dummy Low_Wealth, which assumes the 
value one if at least one of the BA participating to the deal has declared to belong to the lowest 
wealth bracket presented in the IBAN surveys. It is likely that “poorer” BAs could prefer to split 
their investment in two or more payments simply because they might face liquidity constraints at 
t=0. The dummy Low_Wealth is positively related with the supposedly endogenous variable. 
After the test we exclude the variable Equity_infusion_pattern to be affected by endogeneity.  
Turning to hypotheses 4 and 5, we cannot find support for our conjectures as both BAs’ active 
involvement and soft monitoring do not appear to be statistically correlated with the 
performance of angel-backed companies. 
Looking at the impact of the control variables, model outcomes show that BAs’ experience, in 
terms of number past deals, has a positive influence on future firm performance as well as BAs’ 
age, confirming the results of other empirical analysis, previously cited, performed over different 
geographical samples. Similarly, achieving good performances in a four-year time period is easier 
for low capital intensity firms, than for business projects that require greater capital injections. 
As expected, the positive sign of the variable Pre-Investment Revenues, confirms that those firms 
that at t=0 already sell their products or services are more like to perform well in a few years 
than those that still have to start their activity. Since the status of the Pre-Investment Revenues 
also contributes to the definition of the ranking of the Performance-Index in t=0, we run the 
three equations already presented by dropping this possible endogenous variable. As shown in 
Table 6 column (4)-(6) the results related to the main hypotheses remain stable. 
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These results suggest that the contribution to performance by BAs is more effective when it is 
made by teams of co-investors that include BAs with consolidated experience and capabilities to 
access better quality deal flow and selection processes.  
4.2. Robustness checks 
4.2.1. Sub-sampling by age, revenues, size of investment and monitoring.  
We test the robustness of our main empirical findings by running the same regression on 
different sub-samples. In fact, we believe that BAs could more valuable in achieving profitability 
and survival over time in those ventures that are more opaque and potentially more innovative 
than those with an ex-ante higher observable quality. To this end, we run our analysis isolating 
homogeneous groups of firms in terms of age, ex-ante quality (as measured by their pre-
investment revenue capacity) and capital intensity (as measured by their equity endowment).  
First, we create two sub-samples on the basis of the firm-age: the first sub-sample that we call 
“start-up” includes firms with less than three years at t=0, while we call the second sub-sample 
“pre-existing” firms. Second, we split the sample in two groups of firms considering the presence 
of revenues in the investment year. Third, we consider the capital intensity of the business 
dividing the sample on the basis of the median value of the variable Equity.  Finally, by assuming 
the variable Soft-Monitoring to be a proxy of the ex-ante degree of opacity of a business project, 
we create the following two sub-samples: firms characterized by a low or very low monitoring 
and firms object of frequent or continuous controls. Results of the analysis for sub-samples are 
presented in Table 7.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Comparing outcomes of column (1) and (2) we observe some interesting phenomena further 
confirming some major outcomes of the base model. In fact, we find a positive role for co-
investing when the investee companies do not generate revenues. In this segment of companies, 
both the BAs’ active involvement and soft monitoring have an impact statistically significant and 
consistent with research hypotheses number 4 and 5. As in previous analyses, the variable 
Equity_infusion_pattern is significant and shows a negative sign for the firms with zero revenues 
and high capital intensity. The negative impact of a deferred equity injection is especially true for 
those companies where companies visits (soft monitoring) are most frequent, confirming the law 
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effectiveness of such a risk-reducing mechanism. If we focus on firms with no revenue capacity in 
t=0, we find a further evidence about the role of soft monitoring, in that is confirmed its negative 
impact on the performance of angel-backed ventures: for BAs it is much more effective, as a value 
creating contribution, to clearly and transparently commit themselves to active involvement 
behaviors, pre-agreed upon with the entrepreneurial team. 
4.2.2. Sub-sampling by investment year. 
As robustness checks, we perform a set of alternative regression analyses. First, we check for 
possible sample bias by running equation (3) on three sub-samples obtained by progressively 
dropping the deals related to the more distant survey years. The results reported in Table 11 
confirm our main findings. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
4.3. The determinants of survival of angel-backed companies 
As previously discussed, our three-year Performance-Index could be used as an effective proxy 
for estimating the probability of survival of angel-backed firms. To this end, we created a dummy 
variable, “Dead-firms”, assuming value one for those firms that have been closed down beyond 
our four-year observation period and zero if they are still alive. We obtained this information by 
checking through the external data base Orbis and Lexis/Nexis and performing a handmade 
search through Google and LinkedIn. With the above dummies as dependent variables, we run a 
set of logistic regression on the dependent variable Dead-firms, alternatively specifying the main 
explanatory variables as follows: 
Performance Index: our main explanatory variable as introduced in section 3 and ranging from -2 
to +2 
Unsuccessful-firms is a dummy that assumes value 1 when in t=3 a firm shows zero revenues 
and negative net-income (status -1 and -2 of the Performance-Index); 
Successful-firms is a dummy that assumes value 1 when in t=3 a firm shows positive revenues, 
net asset value and net income (status 2 of the Performance-Index). 
Results in Table 9 confirm the effectiveness of the Performance-Index as predictive measure for 
the probability of future success/death of an angel backed firm, as the probability of being alive 
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(death) after our observation period is positively (negatively) related with our Performance-
Index.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
Moreover, the dummy Dead-firms (Surviving-firms) is positively (negatively) related with the 
dummy Unsuccessful-firms and negatively (positively) related with the ordinal variable 
Performance-Index and with the dummy Successful-firms. 
We also test whether using as dependent variable the dummy Dead-firms we obtain results 
consistent with the base model proposed in Table 9. We then run a set of logistic  regressions 
using the same explanatory variables of equation (3). In order to check for the stability of our 
results, we run again the above model but dropping the Dummy_revenues_t0. 
The results presented in Table 14 confirm the outcome of our base model: Co-investing actually 
reduces the probability of being an unsuccessful firm, while deferring in subsequent time periods 
the equity injection by the BA increases the probability of future company close down. 
Additionally, we observe that the probability of close down increases with the firm-age. 
Interesting to highlight, BAN affiliation shows a negative relationship with company failure, 
suggesting that, at least for the worst performing companies, the membership to a given BAN is 
positively correlated to the survival of angel backed companies, consistent with research 
hypothesis 2. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
We finally check whether traditional accounting measures for startups’ size and performance 
show an effective power in predicting the success/failure of a venture. We consider firms’ Total 
Asset and Revenues. Firstly, we test the relationship with the Performance-Index and with the 
dummies Unsuccessful-firms and Successful-firms. As presented in Tables 11, both accounting 
variables are positively related with the Performance-Index , but do not show any significant 
relationship with the two dummies which discriminate our sample firms according to their 
censored survivorship in t=3. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
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We finally test whether the probability of survival in t>3 is affected by the above mentioned 
accounting measures for size and performance. Results in Table 12 (Y=Dead_Firms) show that 
the probability of being alive is not related to firms’ total asset, while only in the univariate 
equation (in column (3)) is affected by firms’ revenues. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
 
5. Conclusions and interpretations 
In this paper, we shed light on one major issue in the entrepreneurial finance literature, that is 
the impact of early-stage investors on performance on funded ventures. In particular, we focus on 
the informal venture capital segment of the equity financing industry, which didn’t receive a 
great deal of attention by scholars mostly because of the intrinsic sample bias limitations 
affecting angels data and of limited availability of financial information of n=investee companies. 
Usually these companies are very small, informationally opaque, sometimes inactive for many 
years and, in many cases, not tracked by structured databases.  
In this study we provide previously unavailable evidence on the post-investment performance 
and probability of survival of angel-backed companies conditional on an original set of 
independent variables related to business angels’ investment practices (Co-investors, 
BAN_Membership, Equity_infusion pattern, Active Involvement, Soft-Monitoring). Contributing to 
the literature we introduce an innovative ordinal metric (“PERFORMANCE-INDEX”) that we use as 
dependent variable differentiating companies according to their revenues and profits generation 
pattern.  
We empirically test empirically test our research hypotheses on a sample of 111 angel-backed 
companies extracted from a unique database containing qualitative and quantitative information 
on over 1,570 deals made by about 1,420 business angels from 2008 to 2015. Our main results 
show that the performance and the probability of survivorship of investee companies are 
positively affected by the presence of angel syndicates of co-investors, suggesting the capability 
of angel syndicates to give rise to higher quality deal flow and selection processes and, 
furthermore, to offer to funded ventures a wider set of non-monetary contributions.  
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Looking at the survivorship of companies, we show that our innovative metric -PERFORMANCE-
INDEX – offers a substantial predictive power, being able to differentiate companies surviving over 
time from companies closing down. We also provide evidence that the membership to a given 
BAN is positively correlated with the survival of angel backed companies, in particular for the 
weakest companies of the sample and that equity capital should be injected in a single 
investment round, rather than fragmented in multiple disbursements.  We interpret this result as 
follows: the immediate investment of the total committed capital is a signal of an high quality 
relationship between the investee company and the angel investors, where the former has been 
able to fully disclose information about the company and the projected investments and the BA, 
thanks to its experience, has been able to provide the required capital together with the right 
incentives. Finally, BAs’ active involvement seems to constitute a value creating mechanism more 
effective than soft monitoring (based on company visits rather than on the formal contractual 
provisions set up by venture capitalists) in driving the angel-backed companies to profitability 
and survival; this is especially true for funded ventures with yet limited revenue capacity at the 
investment period. 
Future research will have to further investigate the contribution of BA and BANs to the 
profitability of funded ventures, by trying to better fine tune the investment process of business 
angel networks, also considering the many possible differences in the kind of activity performed 
by associations with various degrees of internal formal rules, ranging from membership 
mechanisms, to BAN management practices, to the set of services offered to their members.   
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Appendix 
IBAN Survey methodology 
 
Our data are obtained from sequential surveys administered by the Italian Business 
Angels Network Association (IBAN) to its associates and other unaffiliated BAs. IBAN is the 
national trade association for angels and angel groups/networks. 
A known problem in business angel research is estimating the “true” population. Some 
investors in fact, strive for anonymity creating an “invisible market” that is difficult to detect 
using simple survey techniques (Mason and Harrison, 2008; Landström and Mason, 2016). To 
circumvent this issue, IBAN adopted a strategy of integrating the “visible market” – represented 
by BAs and networks/groups affiliated to IBAN – with an estimation of the “invisible” component. 
The estimation is done by supplementing a traditional “snowball sampling” (Schuessler, 1979) – 
based upon the identification on people believed to be business angels through their connections 
with the surveyed BAN-members – with an inferential approach based on the results of a 
domestic research program (Private Equity Monitor PEM) aimed at identifying and analyzing 
private equity and venture capital investors activity. PEM collects information on PE and VC-
backed companies. Focusing on the segment of venture capital-backed companies investments, 
IBAN researchers collected complete ownership data2 from Bureau Van Dijk-AIDA and identified 
individual shareholders whose investment pattern was consistent with that of a business angel 
(Mason 2006). In particular, researchers classified as business angels shareholders that exhibited 
the following characteristics: repeated investor in new companies; non-executive role; non-
majority ownership.  
While acknowledging possible sample biases in the survey data, the rigorous sampling 
method and the repeated nature of the survey over a 7 years period appear to be strong 
mitigating factors that justify confidence in the sample representativeness. 
The survey structure is designed to collect information on the previous year’s operations 
and is conducted through a four-steps process: at the beginning of January, IBAN forwards the 
survey’s website link to its associates and other known or estimated BAs.3 Responses are 
                                                 
2 Italy as numerous European countries, require a relatively high level of disclosure of financial and ownership information that is 
publicly available through government and third-parties sources such as BVD-Aida. 
3 See the IBAN website (www.iban.it) for the survey questionnaire. 
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collected by the first week of March (step 1). Non-responding BAs are contacted by email and 
phone to solicit survey completion (step 2) while an IBAN team reviews the data to identify 
incomplete, wrong or unverifiable answers (step 3), which are further checked through direct 
follow-up calls (step 4). This process is a common survey technique called sequential mixed 
mode (Snjikers et al., 2013). Evidence shows that a mixed mode survey approach significantly 
improves the response rate (De Leeuw, 2005 and Dillman et al., 2009). 
Survey statistics are reported in Table A1. 
 
 
 
IBAN administered 3,000 questionnaires to 929 affiliates and 2,071 non-affiliates from 
2009 (2008 investment data) through 2015 (2014 investment data).   
The overall response rate over the full sample period is 41.7%. The response rate is higher 
(about 47.2%) for the sub-sample of BAN members than for non-BAN members (39.2%) who are 
less likely to respond because of anonymity concerns or possible erroneous estimated 
identification. 
Out of the 1,250 responses the researchers discarded: a) surveys with material 
inconsistencies and b) surveys reporting zero investments. This leads to a final sample of 439 
responses reporting an aggregate of 810 deals, on 619 unique companies by 330 unique 
investors during the 2008 – 2014 time period.  
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